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Filosofie existence - Existencialismus
Existentialism is a term that has been applied to the work of a group of nineteenth and twentieth century philosophers who, despite doctrinal differences, shared the belief that philosophical thinking begins with the human subject — not merely the thinking subject, but the acting, feeling, living human individual. In existentialism, the individual's starting point is characterized by what has been called "the existential attitude," or a sense of disorientation and confusion in the face of an apparently meaningless or absurd world. Many existentialists have also regarded traditional systematic or academic philosophy, in both style and content, as too abstract and remote from concrete human experience.

Existentialism emerged as a movement in twentieth-century literature and philosophy, foreshadowed most notably by nineteenth-century philosophers Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche, though it had forerunners in earlier centuries. Fyodor Dostoevsky and Franz Kafka also described existential themes in their literary works.

Other notable philosophers of existence may follow as such: Albert Camus, Jean-Paul Sartre, Gabriel Marcel, Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

Major concepts

* 5.1 A focus on concrete existence
* 5.2 Existence precedes essence
* 5.3 Angst
* 5.4 Freedom
* 5.5 Facticity
* 5.6 Authenticity and inauthenticity
* 5.7 The Other and The Look
* 5.8 Reason
* 5.9 The Absurd

Jazyk klubu je cestina - hlavicka je v anglictine spise z pohodlnosti :)
Klub by mel reflektovat filosofii, myslenky a pocity filosofu existence, a to i tech, kteri se k filosofum rozhodne nechteli radit (Camus napr.). Ukolem tohoto klubu neni vymyslet nic noveho, spise si polozit otazku, zda a jak je tento myslenkovy proud sto schopny oslovit cloveka a jeho zivot.

Nejaka literatura k nalezeni na http://x.anise.cz/ebook/
Pokud mate nejakou knihu ci autora v elektronicke podobe, ktery spada do tematu a neni zde vylistovan, prosim podelte se (me do posty, pridam to tam)
A prosim, knihy pouze v cestine, pripadne v originalnim jazyce. Cist Nietzscheho v anglictine myslim neni uplne nutne ;)
Máte k tomu co říct? Vložte se do diskuze.
KOMATSU --- 22:52:57 28.7.2010

(with interpretation)

I was reading through the "Letter on Humanism" and found this interesting quote. The context is Heidegger's discussion of man's being as being-in-the-world and its consequences.
With the existential determination of the essence of man, therefore, nothing is decided about the "existence of God" or his "non-being," no more than about the possibility of gods. Thus it is not only rash but also an error in procedure to maintain that the interpretation of the essence of man from the relation of his essence to the truth of Being is atheism. And what is more, this arbitrary classification betrays a lack of careful reading. No one bothers to notice that in my essay "On the Essence of Ground" the following appears: "Through the ontological interpretation of Dasein as being-in-the-world no decision, whether positive or negative, is made concerning a possible being toward God. It is, however, the case that through an illumination of transcendence we first achieve an adequate concept of Dasein, with respect to which it can now be asked how the relationship of Dasein to God is ontologically ordered." If we think about this remark too quickly, as is usually the case, we will declare that such a philosophy does not decide either for or against the existence of god. It remains stalled in indifference. Thus it is unconcerned with the religious question. Such indifferentism ultimately falls prey to nihilism.
But does the foregoing observation teach indifferentism? Why then are particular words in the note italicized--and not just random ones? For no other reason than to indicate that the thinking that thinks from the question concerning the truth of Being questions more primordially than metaphysics can. Only from the truth of Being can the essence of the holy be thought. Only from the essence of the holy is the essence of the divine to be thought. Only in the light of the essence of divinity can it be thought or said what the word "God" is to signify. Or should we not first be able to hear and understand all these words carefully if we are to be permitted as men, that is, as ek-sistent creatures, to experience a relation of God to man? How can man at the present stage of world history ask at all seriously and rigorously whether the god nears or withdraws, when he has above all neglected to think into the dimension in which alone that question can be asked? But this is the dimension of the holy, which indeed remains closed as a dimension if the open region of Being is not cleared and in its clearing is near man. Perhaps what is distinctive about this world-epoch consists in the closure of the dimension of the hale [des Heilen]. Perhaps that is the sole malignancy [Unheil].
"Letter on Humanism," in Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 253-254.

Heidegger's thought is not essentially atheistic, whatever his own religious leanings. However, his thought does elucidate the very grounds on which we can think of the divine: in terms of man's understanding, his being, which must be a factor in the God-man relationship. If we misunderstand man's essential nature then we will also misunderstand his relationship to the divine (as we will his relationship to everything else). Indeed, how can we seriously question the existence of God (whether he "nears or withdraws") when we ignore the very grounds on which that question rests, the very grounds on which such questioning is possible--man's essential relationship with being?
But man's distinctive feature lies in this, that he, as the being who thinks, is open to Being, face to face with Being; thus man remains referred to Being and so answers to it. Man is essentially this relationship of responding to Being, and he is only this. This "only" does not mean a limitation, but rather an excess.
"The Principle of Identity," Identity and Difference, Joan Stambaugh, trans. (New York: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 31.
Such thinking, in the wake of Heidegger's philosophy, has begun in the works of Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion, John Caputo, and Adriaan Peperzak. As with Heidegger's later work on ontology itself, the answer seems to lie in that which is 'beyond being.'
JACOB --- 22:30:27 13.3.2010
z wikipedie :)
KOMATSU --- 21:27:54 13.3.2010
JACOB: Fascinující. Od koho to je?
JACOB --- 20:47:31 12.3.2010
Existentialism asserts that people actually make decisions based on the meaning to them rather than rationally. Kierkegaard saw strong rationality as a mechanism humans use to counter their existential anxiety, their fear of being in the world: "If I can believe that I am rational and everyone else is rational then I have nothing to fear and no reason to feel anxious about being free." However, Kierkegaard advocated rationality as means to interact with the objective world (e.g. in the natural sciences), but when it comes to existential problems, reason is insufficient: "Human reason has boundaries". Sartre saw problems with rationality, calling it a form of "bad faith", an attempt by the self to impose structure on a world of phenomena — "the Other" — that is fundamentally irrational and random. According to Sartre, rationality and other forms of bad faith hinder us from finding meaning in freedom. To try to suppress our feelings of anxiety and dread, we confine ourselves within everyday experience, Sartre asserts, thereby relinquishing our freedom and acquiescing to being possessed in one form or another by "the look" of "the Other" (i.e. possessed by another person — or at least our idea of that other person). In a similar vein, Camus believed that society and religion falsely teach humans that "the Other" has order and structure. For Camus, when an individual's consciousness, longing for order, collides with the Other's lack of order, a third element is born: absurdity.
JACOB --- 12:21:00 1.11.2009
Člověk si ani nemohl položit otázku, odkud to všechno vychází, ani jak je možné, že nějaký svět existuje, víc než co jiného. Nemělo to smysl, svět byl všude přítomen, vpředu, vzadu. Před ním nebylo nic. Nic. Nebyl ani okamžik, kdy by byl mohl neexistovat. To právě mě dráždilo: není samozřejmě žádný důvod, proč by ta tekoucí larva měla existovat. Nebylo však možné, aby neexistovala. Bylo to nemyslitelné: aby si člověk mohl představit nicotu, musí být tu, uprostřed světa, s široce otevřenýma očima a živý: nicota je jen představa v mé hlavě, existující představa, jež se vznáší v té obrovitosti: ta nicota nepřišla před existencí, byla to existence jako každá jiná a objevila se až po mnoha jiných.
JACOB --- 17:48:07 17.10.2009
Hm, no pokud jsem dostatecne dobre rozlustil tvuj podivne krypticky jazyk, tak si nejsem jistej jestli lze srovnavat retenci s vjemem. Upozornuju ale, ze sem Husserla nestudoval :)

Je totiz dulezity si uvedomit, ze protence a retence neni(!) pamet, i kdyz jsem to slovo v predchozim prispevku v uvozovkach pouzil. Jde o to, ze Husserl, narozdil od treba Bergsona bere "soucasny moment", dejme tomu, jako jisty interval, ktery se prave prodluzuje smerem do budoucnosti (protence) a do minulosti (retence)
Napriklad vnimani nejakeho zvuku, treba klavesa klaviru: zmackneme ji, a neco se rozezni, to se rozezni v "TED", o nepatrnou chvilicku pozdeji ale mame ten ton jeste porad "v hlave", nicmene jeste jako kdyby neni v pameti, je "v retenci", a zarovne mame docela dobrou predstavu, jak ten ton bude znit o par milisekund pozdeji, i kdyz je to pro nas jeste budoucnost (protence). A v momente, kdy ten ton dozni, pak teprve si ho ukladame do nejake pameti.
Osobne bych pouzil treba, ze retence a protence je vedomi pomijeni casu, resp. retence a protence doslova "spojuji" ruzne casove okamziky (TED + TED + TED) a pak z nich teprve vytvari souvislou casovou linii (ktera samozrejme sama o sobe souvisla neni a nebude). O necem podobnym mluvi v podstate i existencialismus jako takovy, i kdyz pravda ne vyslovene sourode ;)
FONTAIN --- 18:20:33 16.10.2009
JACOB: ty jo...ta to ja to teda chapu trochu jinak, ale spis verim tobe, protoze ja si moc ve filozofii vyskakovat nemuzu...každopadne to chapu tak, že mame nejakou ur imresi....z te vzbiakjí retence neco jako vjemi, ktere pri svém kriti tvori invariant a z techto invarian vznikaji protence, ktere urcuji nas smer....
muze to byt nejak tak?
JACOB --- 20:09:53 15.10.2009
no tak protence je opak retence, takze pokud chapes retenci jako nejakou "rozsirenou pamet pritomnosti" smerem do minulosti, tak protence je v podstate nejake "ocekavani" smerem do budoucnosti, vuci tomu, co linie retence -> soucasnost -> protence ukazuje a co se da takto odhadnout
alespon tak nejak jsem to vetsinou chapal ja
FONTAIN --- 18:51:56 15.10.2009
muzete mi nekdo prosim pomoci pochopit protence..??? retence chapúu, ale nejak se nemuzu pres ty protence dostat